Rotational analysis of ChaCha permutation by Barbero, Stefano et al.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
8.
13
40
6v
1 
 [m
ath
.C
O]
  3
1 A
ug
 20
20
Rotational analysis of ChaCha permutation
Stefano Barbero1, Emanuele Bellini2, and Rusydi Makarim2
1 Politecnico di Torino, Italy
2 Cryptography Research Centre, Technology Innovation Institute, UAE
Abstract. We show that the underlying permutation of ChaCha20 stream
cipher does not behave as a random permutation for up to 17 rounds with
respect to rotational cryptanalysis. In particular, we derive a lower and
an upper bound for the rotational probability through ChaCha quarter
round, we show how to extend the bound to a full round and then to the
full permutation. The obtained bounds show that the probability to find
what we call a parallel rotational collision is, for example, less than 2−488
for 17 rounds of ChaCha permutation, while for a random permutation
of the same input size, this probability is 2−511. We remark that our
distinguisher is not an attack to ChaCha20 stream cipher, but rather a
theoretical analysis of its internal permutation from the point of view of
rotational cryptanalysis.
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1 Introduction
Salsa20 [9] and ChaCha20 [8] are two closely related stream ciphers developed by
Daniel J. Bernstein. Salsa20, the original cipher, was designed in 2005, then later
submitted to the eSTREAM project by Daniel J. Bernstein [5]. Its detailed spec-
ification can be found in [5]. ChaCha20 is a modification of Salsa20, published
by Bernstein in 2008, aimed at increasing diffusion and performance on some
architectures. Google has selected ChaCha20 along with Bernsteins Poly1305
message authentication code as a replacement for RC4 in TLS, and its specifica-
tions can be found in [15]. Both ciphers are ARX (Add-Rotate-Xor) ciphers, i.e.
built on a pseudorandom function based only on the following three operations:
32-bit modular addition, circular rotation, and bitwise exclusive or (XOR). This
pseudorandom function is itself built upon a 512 bit permutation. According to
[10], both permutations are not designed to simulate ideal permutations: they
are designed to simulate ideal permutations with certain symmetries, i.e., ideal
permutations of the orbits of the state space under these symmetries. The in-
put of the Salsa and ChaCha function is partially fixed to specific asymmetric
constants, guaranteeing that different inputs lie in different orbits. To our knowl-
edge, while for Salsa some of these properties of ”non-pseudorandomness” are
well known, this is not the case for ChaCha (see Section subsection 1.3). Again
to our knowledge, because of the use of asymmetric constants injected into the
input state of the permutation, none of these properties can be used to attack the
entire stream cipher, or other ciphers where these permutations have been reused,
as Salsa20 permutation in the Rumba20 compression function [7], a tweaked ver-
sion of the ChaCha20 permutation in the BLAKE and BLAKE2 hash functions
[1], or ChaCha12 permutation in the original SPHINCS post-quantum signature
scheme [10] 3.
That said, studying mathematical properties of the Salsa and ChaCha per-
mutations is still of theoretical interest, and it is useful to understand how these
permutations can be reused to design other cryptographic primitives.
1.1 Our contribution
In this work, we show that ChaCha permutation does not behave as a ran-
dom permutation, with respect to rotational cryptanalysis. To do so, we first
derive and formally prove a lower and an upper bound for the probability of
the propagation of rotational pairs through ChaCha quarter round. We provide
experimental evidence of the correctness of the bounds by testing them on a toy
version of ChaCha permutation. We then show how to extend the bounds to a
full round and then to the full permutation. The obtained bounds allow us to
distinguish ChaCha permutation, with for example 17 rounds, from a random
permutation by using 2489 calls to an oracle running either ChaCha permutation
or the random permutation. To do so, we prove that what we call a parallel rota-
tional collision, is more likely to happen in ChaCha permutation, rather than in
a random permutation. For example, such a collision happens with probability
less than 2−488 for ChaCha permutation with 17 rounds, while with probability
2−511 for a random permutation. This distinguisher is not an attack to ChaCha20
stream cipher, but rather a theoretical analysis of its permutation from the point
of view of rotational cryptanalysis.
1.2 Outline of the paper
In subsection 1.3 we briefly summarize the existing studies on the core function
of Salsa and ChaCha stream ciphers. In section 2, we introduce the notation
used throughout this manuscript and recall ChaCha permutation specifications.
In section 3, we derive the lower and upper bound on the probability of the
propagation of a rotational pair for ChaCha quarter round, for the full rounds,
and for the full permutation. In section 4, we describe a distinguihser exploiting
the above mentioned bounds. Finally, in section 5, we conclude the manuscript.
1.3 Related works
Often, rather than only considering the underlying permutation of Salsa and
ChaCha, researchers study the so called Salsa (or ChaCha) core function (also
3 The current SPHINCS submission to the NIST post-quantum standardization pro-
cess does not use ChaCha anymore.
called ChaCha block function in [15]), whose output consists in applying the
permutation and then xoring the output of the permutation with its input.
Already in the specifications of Salsa20 [6], there is an example showing how
the 0 vector is a fixed point for Salsa core function. This is also true for ChaCha.
In [13], the authors find4 an invariant for Salsa core main building block,
the quarterround function, that is then extended to the row-round and column-
round functions. This allows them to find an input subset of size 232 for which
the Salsa20 core behaves exactly as the transformation f(x) = 2x. This allows to
construct 231 collisions for any number of rounds. They also show a differential
characteristic with probability one that proves that the Salsa20 core does not
have 2nd preimage resistance. In [3], it is pointed out that none of the results in
[13] has an impact on security of Salsa20 stream cipher, due to the use of fixed
constants in the input. Indeed, Salsa20 is not designed to be a collision-resistant
compression function [4].
In the Salsa20 security document [2, Section 4], two other symmetries of the
cipher are reported, i.e.
– shifting the entire Salsa20 core input array along the diagonal has exactly
the same effect on the output, i.e.
y0,0 y0,1 y0,2 y0,3
y1,0 y1,1 y1,2 y1,3
y2,0 y2,1 y2,2 y2,3
y3,0 y3,1 y3,2 y3,3
 = Salsa


x0,0 x0,1 x0,2 x0,3
x1,0 x1,1 x1,2 x1,3
x2,0 x2,1 x2,2 x2,3
x3,0 x3,1 x3,2 x3,3



y3,3 y3,0 y3,1 y3,2
y0,3 y0,0 y0,1 y0,2
y1,3 y1,0 y1,1 y1,2
y2,3 y2,0 y2,1 y2,2
 = Salsa


x3,3 x3,0 x3,1 x3,2
x0,3 x0,0 x0,1 x0,2
x1,3 x1,0 x1,1 x1,2
x2,3 x2,0 x2,1 x2,2

 ;
– the Salsa20 core operations are almost compatible with rotation of each input
word by, say, 10 bits.
This shift and rotation structures are eliminated by the use of fixed constants in
the input diagonal. Precisely, the input diagonal is different from all its nontrivial
shifts and all its nontrivial rotations and all nontrivial shifts of its nontrivial
rotations. In other words, two distinct arrays with this diagonal are always in
distinct orbits under the shift/rotate group.
We are not aware of similar properties for the case of the ChaCha permuta-
tion. In particular, we are not aware of any study of the rotational properties of
the ChaCha permutation.
4 According to the authors and to [3], most of these results were already informally
observed by Matt Robshaw in June 2005, and independently posted to sci.crypt by
David Wagner in September 2005, but we could not find any reference besides [16].
2 ChaCha permutation description
In this section, we first define our notation, then we describe the specifications
of ChaCha permutation. We do not describe the entire details of ChaCha as a
stream cipher.
2.1 Notation
Let F2 be the binary field with two elements, andMn×n(F
w
2 ) the set of all n× n
matrices with elements in Fw2 . We indicate with lowercase letters w-bit words,
i.e. x ∈ Fw2 , with bold lower case letters vectors of n words, i.e. x ∈ (F
w
2 )
n, and
with uppercase letters a n× n matrix of n2 words, i.e. X ∈ Mn×n(F
w
2 ).
We use the following notation:
– ⊕ for the bitwise exclusive or (XOR), i.e. the addition in Fw2 ;
– ⊞ for the w-bit addition mod 2w;
– ⊞ki=1ai for the w-bit addition mod 2
w of k words a1, . . . , ak
– ≪ r and ≫ r for constant-distance left and right, respectively, circular
rotation of r bits of a w-bit word (with w > r). When needed, we also use
the following more compact notation:
• ←−x r = x≪ r;
•
←−←−
x
r = (←−x0
r, . . . ,←−−xn−1
r) the parallel left circular rotation of a n-word vector
•
←−←−
X r =

←−−x0,0
r . . . ←−−−x0,n−1
r
...
. . .
...
←−−−xn−1,0
r . . .←−−−−−xn−1,n−1
r
 the parallel left circular rotation of the
w-bit elements of the matrix X ∈Mn×n(F
w
2 ).
When clear from the context, we omit the subscript r, and simply write ←−x ,
←−←−
x , and
←−←−
X .
In the case of ChaCha, we have n = 4 and w = 32.
2.2 ChaCha permutation specification
ChaCha permutation has a state of 512 bits, which can be seen as a 4×4 matrix
whose elements are binary vectors of w = 32 bits, i.e.
X = {xi,j}i=0,...,3
j=0,...,3
=

x0,0 x0,1 x0,2 x0,3
x1,0 x1,1 x1,2 x1,3
x2,0 x2,1 x2,2 x2,3
x3,0 x3,1 x3,2 x3,3
 ∈Mn×n(Fw2 ) .
Definition 1 (ChaCha quarter round). Let xi, yi, i = 0, 1, 2, 3 be w-bit words,
and let (y0, y1, y2, y3) = Q(x0, x1, x2, x3), where Q is ChaCha quarter round, de-
fined as follows:
b0 = x0 ⊞ x1 (1)
b3 = (b0 ⊕ x3)≪ r1 (2)
b2 = b3 ⊞ x2 (3)
b1 = (b2 ⊕ x1)≪ r2. (4)
and
y0 = b0 ⊞ b1 (5)
y3 = (y0 ⊕ b3)≪ r3 (6)
y2 = y3 ⊞ b2 (7)
y1 = (y2 ⊕ b1)≪ r4 (8)
≪ r2
≪ r3
≪ r4
≪ r1
x0 x1 x2 x3
y0 y1 y2 y3
b0
b1
b2
b3
Fig. 1: The ChaCha quarter round.
We show in Fig. 1 a schematic drawing of the Chacha quarter round. The
permutation used in ChaCha20 stream cipher performs 20 rounds or, equiva-
lently, 10 double rounds. Two consecutive rounds (or a double round) of ChaCha
permutation consist in applying the quarter round four times in parallel to the
columns of the state (first round), and then four times in parallel to the diagonals
of the state (second round). More formally:
Definition 2 (ChaCha column/diagonal round). Let X = {xi,j}i=0,...,3
j=0,...,3
and Y = {yi,j}i=0,...,3
j=0,...,3
be two matrices in Mn×n(F
w
2 ).
A column round Y = RC(X) is defined as follows, with i = 0, 1, 2, 3:
(y0,i, y1,i, y2,i, y3,i) = Q(x0,i, x1,i, x2,i, x3,i) .
A diagonal round Y = RD(X) is defined as follows, for i = 0, 1, 2, 3 and
where each pedix is computed modulo n = 4:
(y0,i, y1,i+1, y2,i+2, y3,i+3) = Q(x0,i, x1,i+1, x2,i+2, x3,i+3) .
3 Propagation of rotational pairs
In this section, we first define a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for
the propagation of rotational pairs through ChaCha quarter round. We then use
these conditions to derive a lower and an upper bound for the probability of this
propagation to happen through the quarter round. Then, we describe how to
extend the bounds to a full round, and finally to the full permutation.
3.1 Conditions for rotational pairs propagation
We are interested in studying the probability of the propagation through the
quarter rounds of rotational pairs, i.e., of
p = Pr[(←−y0
r,←−y1
r,←−y2
r,←−y3
r) = Q(←−x0
r,←−x1
r,←−x2
r,←−x3
r)] . (9)
To do so, we first prove the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Given ChaCha quarter round Q defined as above with the non
negative integers r1, r2, r3, r4 ≤ w−1, and given the rotational amount r ≤ w−1,
then
(y0≪ r, y1≪ r, y2≪ r, y3≪ r) = Q(x0≪ r, x1≪ r, x2≪ r, x3≪ r)
⇐⇒
(x0≪ r) ⊞ (x1≪ r) = (x0 ⊞ x1)≪ r
(b3≪ r) ⊞ (x2≪ r) = (b3 ⊞ x2)≪ r
((x0 ⊞ x1)≪ r)⊞ (b1≪ r) = (x0 ⊞ x1 ⊞ b1)≪ r
(y3≪ r) ⊞ ((b3 ⊞ x2)≪ r) = (y3 ⊞ b3 ⊞ x2)≪ r .
Proof. Let us consider what happens to the output if, instead of the input
(x0, x1, x2, x3), we use the input (x0 ≪ r, x1 ≪ r, x2 ≪ r, x3 ≪ r), where
every string is rotated r places to the left. First of all we find
b˜0 = (x0≪ r) ⊞ (x1≪ r) (10)
b˜3 =
(
b˜0 ⊕ (x3≪ r)
)
≪ r1 (11)
b˜2 = b˜3 ⊞ (x2≪ r) (12)
b˜1 =
(
b˜2 ⊕ (x1≪ r)
)
≪ r2 (13)
and
y˜0 = b˜0 ⊞ b˜1 (14)
y˜3 =
(
y˜0 ⊕ b˜3
)
≪ r3 (15)
y˜2 = y˜3 ⊞ b˜2 (16)
y˜1 =
(
y˜2 ⊕ b˜1
)
≪ r4 (17)
Now, the conditions that must be simultaneously fulfilled in order to obtain
(y0≪ r, y1≪ r, y2≪ r, y3≪ r) = (y˜0, y˜1, y˜2, y˜3) , (18)
are the following:
y˜0 = y0≪ r⇐⇒ b˜0 ⊞ b˜1 = (b0 ⊞ b1)≪ r (19)
y˜3 = y3≪ r⇐⇒
(
y˜0 ⊕ b˜3
)
≪ r3 = ((y0 ⊕ b3)≪ r3)≪ r (20)
y˜2 = y2≪ r⇐⇒ y˜3 ⊞ b˜2 = (y3 ⊞ b2)≪ r (21)
y˜1 = y1≪ r⇐⇒
(
y˜2 ⊕ b˜1
)
≪ r4 = ((y2 ⊕ b1)≪ r4)≪ r (22)
These constraints can be simplified, observing that from (20), considering the
condition y˜0 = y0 ≪ r and thanks to the distributive property of bit rotation
with respect to ⊕, we have(
(y0≪ r)⊕ b˜3
)
≪ r3 = ((y0 ⊕ b3)≪ r3)≪ r
= ((y0≪ r)⊕ (b3≪ r))≪ r3 .
Thus, we must have
b˜3 = b3≪ r (23)
and from (22) in an analogous way, using the condition y˜2 = y2 ≪ r, we find
that
b˜1 = b1≪ r (24)
must hold. Now considering (23) and equalities (2) and (11) we easily observe
that(
b˜0≪ r1
)
⊕ ((x3≪ r)≪ r1) = ((b0≪ r)≪ r1)⊕ ((x3≪ r)≪ r1)
and we find
b˜0 = b0≪ r. (25)
In a similar way, considering (24) and equalities (4) and (13) we have(
b˜2≪ r2
)
⊕ ((x1≪ r)≪ r2) = ((b2≪ r)≪ r2)⊕ ((x1≪ r)≪ r2)
obtaining
b˜2 = b2≪ r. (26)
Thus condition (18) corresponds to the following four conditions
b˜0 = b0≪ r (27)
b˜2 = b2≪ r (28)
(b0≪ r)⊞ (b1≪ r) = (b0 ⊞ b1)≪ r (29)
(y3≪ r)⊞ (b2≪ r) = (y3 ⊞ b2)≪ r (30)
or equivalently
(x0≪ r) ⊞ (x1≪ r) = (x0 ⊞ x1)≪ r (31)
(b3≪ r) ⊞ (x2≪ r) = (b3 ⊞ x2)≪ r (32)
((x0 ⊞ x1)≪ r) ⊞ (b1≪ r) = (x0 ⊞ x1 ⊞ b1)≪ r (33)
(y3≪ r)⊞ ((b3 ⊞ x2)≪ r) = (y3 ⊞ b3 ⊞ x2)≪ r (34)
⊓⊔
Remark 1. Before trying to estimate the probability p, i.e., that all conditions
(31), (32), (33) and (34) simultaneously hold, we observe that the rotation r4
used in ChaCha quarter round function is not involved in any of these equations,
neither implicitly nor explicitly.
3.2 Bounds for the quarter round
We recall the result obtained in Corollary 4.12 by Daum [12] on the propagation
of the rotational probability with respect to modular addition.
Proposition 2. Let a and b be independent and uniformly distributed strings
of w bits, and 1 ≤ r ≤ w− 1 an integer. Then
D = Pr[(a≪ r) ⊞ (b≪ r) = (a⊞ b)≪ r] =
=
1 + 2−(w−r) + 2−r + 2−w
4
=
(2r + 1)(2w−r + 1)
2w+2
.
(35)
The previous result can be generalized for the case where we have more than 2
addends.
Proposition 3. Let a1, a2, . . . , ak be independent and uniformly distributed strings
of w bits, and 1 ≤ r ≤ w− 1 an integer. Then
Pr
[
⊞
k
i=1 (ai≪ r) =
(
⊞
k
i=1ai
)
≪ r
]
=
F (r, k,w)F (w − r, k,w)
2kw
(36)
where, for 1 ≤ q ≤ w− 1,
F (q, k,w) =
∑⌊ k(2q−1)2w ⌋
h=0
∑k
j=0(−1)
j
(
k
j
) ((
h2w−(j−1)2q−1+k
h2w−(j−1)2q−1
)
−
(
h2w−j2q−1+k
h2w−j2q−1
))
. (37)
Proof. In order to evaluate the number of solutions to
⊞
k
i=1 (ai≪ r) =
(
⊞
k
i=1ai
)
≪ r (38)
i.e., how many w-bit words a1, . . . , ak satisfy (38), we represent every binary
string ai and its left rotation by r as integers:
ai = a
L
i 2
w−r + aRi ,
ai≪ r = a
R
i 2
r + aLi
where 0 ≤ aLi ≤ 2
r − 1 and 0 ≤ aRi ≤ 2
w−r − 1, are, respectively, the integers
represented by the left r places and right w − r places of the binary string ai.
Now, if
k∑
i=1
aLi = m2
r + w,
k∑
i=1
aRi = t2
w−r + s (39)
with m, t, w, s non negative integers such that w ≤ 2r − 1 and s ≤ 2w−r − 1, we
have
(
⊞
k
i=1ai
)
=
((
k∑
i=1
aLi
)
2w−r +
k∑
i=1
aRi
)
mod 2w = ((w+ t)2w−r+ s) mod 2w
thus, since s ≤ 2w−r − 1(
⊞
k
i=1ai
)
≪ r = s2r + u, u = (w + t) mod 2r (40)
On the other hand
⊞
k
i=1 (ai≪ r) =
((
k∑
i=1
aRi
)
2r +
k∑
i=1
aLi
)
mod 2w = ((s+m)2r + w) mod 2w
and since w ≤ 2r − 1
⊞
k
i=1 (ai≪ r) = v2
r + w, v = (s+m) mod 2w−r (41)
Thus from (40) and (41) we have that (38) holds if and only if
s2r + u = v2r + w (42)
Hence by (40) and since w ≤ 2r − 1 we have
u = (w + t) mod 2r = w mod 2r
which implies
t = c2r c ∈ N (43)
and also that u = w. Thus we find from equality (42) that s must be equal to v,
which implies
m = d2w−r d ∈ N (44)
since from (41) we have v = (s+m) mod 2w−r. Therefore substituting (43) and
(44) in (39) we observe that in order to count the number of solutions to (38)
we have to count the number F (q, k,w) of solutions in non negative integers yi
of the systems {∑k
i=1 yi = h2
w + l
0 ≤ yi ≤ 2
q − 1
(45)
with l = 0, 1, . . . , 2q − 1 and where h = 0, . . . ,
⌊
k(2q−1)
2w
⌋
since we must have
h2w + l ≤ k(2q − 1) or equivalently
h+
l
2w
≤
k(2q − 1)
2w
, 0 ≤
l
2w
< 1
Thanks to Theorem 4.3 p. 138 of [11] the number of solutions of (45) for a fixed
value of l is
k∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
k
j
)(
h2w + l− j2q + k − 1
h2w + l − j2q
)
,
thus summing for all the values of l gives
2q−1∑
l=0
k∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
k
j
)(
h2w + l − j2q + k − 1
h2w + l − j2q
)
=
=
k∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
k
j
) h2w−(j−1)2q−1∑
i=h2w−j2q
(
i+ k − 1
i
)
=
=
k∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
k
j
)((
h2w − (j − 1)2q − 1 + k
h2w − (j − 1)2q − 1
)
−
(
h2w − j2q − 1 + k
h2w − j2q − 1
))
and with a final summation on the values of h we obtain (37). Therefore the
number of solutions to (38) clearly is the product F (r, k,w)F (w − r, k,w) and
since we have 2kw possible choices for the k w-bit strings ai we easily obtain
(36). ⊓⊔
Remark 2. In Proposition 3 we have derived a formula for the probability that
equality (38) holds. This result is in general different from the one on chained
modular addictions in Lemma 2 of [14] since we do not deal with a chain and so
we do not request that all the conditions similar to (38) involving a1, a2, . . . , ah
with h = 2, . . . , k − 1 must also be simultaneously satisfied.
Corollary 1. Let a, b, c be independent and uniformly distributed strings of w
bits, and 1 ≤ r ≤ w− 1 an integer. Then
Pr [(a≪ r) ⊞ (b≪ r) ⊞ (c≪ r) = (a⊞ b⊞ c)≪ r] =
=
D(2r + 2)(2w−r + 2)
9 · 2w
+ 1{r=1∨r=w−1}
4
23w
(
2w−1
2w−1 − 3
)
= P (r,w)
(46)
where with 1Z we indicate the usual characteristic function of Z, which is equal
to 1 when Z is true and equal to 0 when Z is false.
Proof. If we use formula (36) with k = 3 and 1 ≤ q ≤ w− 1 we observe that
3(2q − 1)
2w
=
2q+1 + 2q − 3
2w
=
2q+1
2w
+
2q − 3
2w
thus since 0 < 2
q−3
2w < 1 we have⌊
3 (2q − 1)
2w
⌋
= 1
when q = w − 1. Therefore when we use (36) with r = w − 1 or, equivalently,
r = 1 we find from (37)
F (1, 3,w) = 4, F (w − 1, 3,w) =
(
2w−1 + 2
2w−1 − 1
)
+
(
2w−1
2w−1 − 3
)
while if 2 ≤ r ≤ w − 2 we have
F (r, 3,w) =
(
2r + 2
2r − 1
)
, F (w− r, 3,w) =
(
2w−r + 2
2w−r − 1
)
since in these situations 0 < 3(2
q−1)
2w < 1 for q = r,w− r. Thus a straightforward
calculation shows that (46) holds. ⊓⊔
Remark 3. We observe that when 2 ≤ r ≤ w− 2 this result shows a value equal
to case k = 3 of Lemma 2 in [14] , in which we have the probability of chained
modular additions for a1, a2, . . . , ak, w-bits words chosen at random given by
Pr[E ] =
1
23w
(
2r + 2
2r − 1
)(
2w−r + 2
2w−r − 1
)
=
D(2r + 2)(2w−r + 2)
9 · 2w
(47)
where
E = [(a1 ⊞ a2)≪ r = (a1≪ r)⊞ (a2≪ r)]∩
[(a1 ⊞ a2 ⊞ a3)≪ r = (a1≪ r)⊞ (a2≪ r)⊞ (a3≪ r)] .
(48)
On the other hand when r = 1 or r = w− 1 from (46) we find the different value
P (1,w) = P (w− 1,w) =
4(22w−3 + 1)
3 · 22w
.
which is greater than the corresponding one given by (47) This is an immediate
consequence of the fact that if k = 3 we have one more addend to be considered
in (37) only when r = 1,w − 1, i. e., more solutions to (38) than to the system
of equalities in (48).
We now show how to obtain an upper and lower bound for the rotational
probability.
Theorem 1. The rotational probability p of a single ChaCha quarter round is
such that,
D3P (r,w) ≤ p ≤
(
D(2r + 2)(2w−r + 2)
9 · 2w
)2
(49)
Proof. Let us suppose that we can couple equations (31), (33) and equations (32),
(34), considering respectively x0, x1, b1 and y3, b3, x2 as two triplets of random w-
bits words. Then we may find an upper bound for p multiplying the probabilities
of the two chains
E1 = [(x0 ⊞ x1)≪ r = (x0≪ r)⊞ (x1≪ r)]∩
[(x0 ⊞ x1 ⊞ b1)≪ r = (x0≪ r)⊞ (x1≪ r) ⊞ (b1≪ r)]
E2 = [(b3 ⊞ x2)≪ r = (b3≪ r)⊞ (x2≪ r)]∩
[(y3 ⊞ b3 ⊞ x2)≪ r = (y3≪ r) ⊞ (b3≪ r)⊞ (x2≪ r)]
obtaining p ≤ Pr[E1] Pr[E2] = Pr[E ]
2 , i.e., p ≤
(
D(2r+2)(2w−r+2)
9·2w
)2
since in the
real situation, where those triplets of words are in general not all independent,
there are less possible values which satisfy conditions (31), (32), (33), (34), with
respect to all possible value that they may assume.
In order to obtain a lower bound we observe that (31) and (32) hold with prob-
ability D since we may consider (x0, x1) and (b3, x2) as couples of independent
and uniformly distributed random variables. Moreover we may also request the
restrictive condition that (y3, b3⊞x2) are independent and uniformly distributed
random variables such that also (34) hold with probability D, considering for
(33) the probability given by (46) and obtaining p ≥ D3P (r,w) . Thus we have
D3P (r,w) ≤ p ≤
(
D(2r+2)(2w−r+2)
9·2w
)2
. ⊓⊔
3.3 Experimental result
To have an additional experimental confirmation of the correctness of the bounds
in Theorem 1, we implemented a toy version of ChaCha quarter round, us-
ing smaller word bit size and several different combinations of round rotations
r0, r1, r2, r3,. To run the experiment, we exhaustively search through all possi-
ble values of (x0, x1, x2, x3), then we computed (
←−x0
r, . . . ,←−x3
r), evaluated both
4tuples over the quarter round function Q, and finally checked if the condition
(←−y0
r, . . . ,←−y3
r) = Q(←−x0
r, . . . ,←−x3
r) was verified, and counted how many times we
would happen (#collisions column in Table 1). In Table 1, we show some of the
results for word size of 4, 5, and 6 bits. The value p is the probability to have
a rotational collision for a random permutation f , i.e. p = Pr[(←−y0
r, . . . ,←−y3
r) =
f(←−x0
r, . . . ,←−x3
r)]. Notice that the case r is equal to w − r, so we do not report it
in the table.
w = 4, (r0, r1, r2, r3) = (1, 3, 2, 1)
r #collisions Lower Bound p Upper Bound p
1 747 0.00880 ∼ 2−6.83 0.01140 0.01373 ∼ 2−6.19 2−16.00
2 388 0.00582 ∼ 2−7.42 0.00592 0.00954 ∼ 2−6.71 2−16.00
w = 5, (r1, r2, r3, r4) = (4, 3, 2, 1)
r #collisions Lower Bound p Upper Bound p
1 8917 0.00630 ∼ 2−7.31 0.00850 0.00992 ∼ 2−6.66 2−20.00
2 3405 0.00318 ∼ 2−8.30 0.00325 0.00536 ∼ 2−7.54 2−20.00
w = 6, (r1, r2, r3, r4) = (5, 3, 2, 1)
r #collisions Lower Bound p Upper Bound p
1 123317 0.00528 ∼ 2−7.57 0.00735 0.00834 ∼ 2−6.91 2−24.00
2 39482 0.00228 ∼ 2−8.78 0.00235 0.00388 ∼ 2−8.01 2−24.00
3 32628 0.00174 ∼ 2−9.17 0.00194 0.00302 ∼ 2−8.37 2−24.00
Table 1. Experimental results on a toy version of ChaCha quarter round.
3.4 Bounds propagation through the full round
We indicate with
– Y = R(X) the application of one round of the ChaCha permutation (either
a column or a diagonal round).
– Y = Ri(X) the application of i consecutive round of the ChaCha permuta-
tion, alternating column to diagonal rounds (where the first round R1 is a
column round).
The following theorem shows how to extend the lower and upper bounds of
Theorem 1 from the ChaCha quarter round to one full round of the ChaCha
permutation.
Theorem 2. Let L,U be such that L ≤ Pr
[←−←−
y = Q(
←−←−
x )
]
≤ U. Then
L
n ≤ Pr
[←−←−
Y = R(
←−←−
X )
]
≤ Un (50)
Proof. Since a full round applies n quarter rounds independently in parallel, to
extend the bounds from Theorem 1 it is sufficient to multiply the probabilities,
i.e., for the rounds where the quarter round is applied to the columns we have
Pr
[←−←−
Y = R(
←−←−
X )
]
=
Pr


←−−y0,0
...
←−−−yn−1,0
 = Q

←−−x0,0
...
←−−−yn−1,0
 ∧ · · · ∧

←−−−y0,n−1
...
←−−−−−yn−1,n−1
 = Q

←−−−x0,n−1
...
←−−−−−yn−1,n−1

 =
Pr


←−−y0,0
...
←−−−yn−1,0
 = Q

←−−x0,0
...
←−−−yn−1,0

 · . . . · Pr


←−−−y0,n−1
...
←−−−−−yn−1,n−1
 = Q

←−−−x0,n−1
...
←−−−−−yn−1,n−1

 .
For the rounds where the quarter round is applied to the diagonals, the proof is
alike. ⊓⊔
Recall that, in Theorem 1, for n = 4, we proved that L = D3P (r,w) and U =(
D(2r+2)(2w−r+2)
9·2w
)2
.
3.5 Bounds propagation through the full permutation
The following theorem shows how to extend the lower and upper bounds of
Theorem 2 from one round of ChaCha to i consecutive rounds. To prove the
theorem, we make an assumption that seems to be a good approximation of
what happens in practice, i.e. we assume that the input states of each round are
independent and uniformly distributed.
Theorem 3. Let L,U be such that L ≤ Pr
[←−←−
y = Q(
←−←−
x )
]
≤ U. Then
L
ni ≤ Pr
[←−←−
Y = Ri(
←−←−
X )
]
≤ Uni (51)
Proof. Because of Theorem 2, we have that Ln ≤ Pr
[←−←−
Y = R1(
←−←−
X )
]
≤ Un. For
the inductive step, notice that Pr
[←−←−
Y = Ri(
←−←−
X )
]
= Pr
[←−←−
Y = R(Ri−1(
←−←−
X ))
]
.
Thus, for the assumption of independence of each state, we have that the equal-
ity Pr
[←−←−
Y = R(Ri−1(
←−←−
X ))
]
= Pr
[←−←−
Y = R(
←−−−−−−←−−−−−−
Ri−1(X))
]
holds with probability
bounded by Ln and Un. ⊓⊔
4 Distinguisher description
When
←−←−
y
r = F (
←−←−
x
r), we say that F has a parallel rotational collision (or simply
a rotational collision) in x with respect to r. In this section, we show that, up to
a certain number of rounds, ChaCha permutation has more rotational collisions
with respect to a random permutation with a fixed point. We first describe what
is the probability to have a rotational collision for a random permutation Π with
a fixed point. Then, we use this probability and the bounds from subsection 3.5
to distinguish ChaCha permutation from Π .
4.1 Rotational collisions of a random permutation
For every set A, let S(A) be the group of permutations overA. Moreover, for each
permutation Π : (Fw2 )
k → (Fw2 )
k let CΠ := #
{
x ∈ (Fw2 )
k : Π(
←−←−
x ) =
←−−−←−−−
Π(x)
}
be
the number of rotational collisions of Π . We want first to compute the expected
number of rotational collisions of a random permutation.
Proposition 4. We have #
{
x ∈
(
F
w
2
)k
: x =
←−←−
x
}
= 2k gcd(w,r) .
Proof. For each x = (x1, . . . , xk) ∈
(
F
w
2
)k
we have x =
←−←−
x if and only if xi =
←−xi
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Hence, it is enough to show that #
{
x ∈ Fw2 : x =
←−x
}
=
2gcd(w,r) . In turn, this is equivalent to the assertion that the permutation of
Z/wZ given by k 7→ k + r has gcd(w, r) cycles, which is a well-known fact. ⊓⊔
We can now compute the expected number of rotational collisions of a random
permutation.
Proposition 5. Let Π be a uniformly random variable in S
(
(Fw2 )
k
)
. Then
E[CΠ ] =
2wk + 22k gcd(w,r) − 2k gcd(w,r)+1
2wk − 1
.
Proof. By the definition of expected value, we have
E[CΠ ] =
1
#S
(
(Fw2 )
k
) ∑
Π∈S((Fw
2
)k)
#
{
x ∈ (Fw2 )
k : Π(
←−←−
x ) =
←−−−←−−−
Π(x)
}
=
1
(2wk)!
∑
Π∈S((Fw
2
)k)
∑
x∈(Fw
2
)k
1
[
Π(
←−←−
x ) =
←−−−←−−−
Π(x)
]
=
1
(2wk)!
∑
x∈(Fw
2
)k
∑
Π∈S((Fw
2
)k)
1
[
Π(
←−←−
x ) =
←−−−←−−−
Π(x)
]
=
1
(2wk)!
∑
x∈(Fw
2
)k
#
{
Π ∈ S
(
(Fw2 )
k
)
: Π(
←−←−
x ) =
←−−−←−−−
Π(x)
}
=
1
(2wk)!
∑
x,y∈(Fw
2
)k
Nx,y,
where Nx,y := #
{
Π ∈ S
(
(Fw2 )
k
)
: Π(x) = y ∧ Π(
←−←−
x ) =
←−←−
y
}
, for every x,y ∈
(Fw2 )
k. Hence, we have to compute Nx,y. There are four cases:
1. If x =
←−←−
x and y =
←−←−
y , then Nx,y = (2
wk − 1)!
2. If x 6=
←−←−
x and y 6=
←−←−
y , then Nx,y = (2
wk − 2)!
3. If x 6=
←−←−
x and y =
←−←−
y , then Nx,y = 0
4. If x =
←−←−
x and y 6=
←−←−
y , then Nx,y = 0
Consequently, using also Proposition 4, we get the claimed formula:
E[CΠ ] =
1
(2wk)!

∑
x,y∈(Fw
2
)k
x=
←−←−
x , y=
←−←−
y
(2wk − 1)! +
∑
x,y∈(Fw
2
)k
x 6=
←−←−
x , y 6=
←−←−
y
(2wk − 2)!

=
1
2wk
∑
x,y∈(Fw
2
)k
x=
←−−
x , y=
←−−
y
1 +
1
2wk(2wk − 1)
∑
x,y∈(Fw
2
)k
x 6=
←−−
x , y 6=
←−−
y
1
=
1
2wk
· 22k gcd(w,r) +
1
2wk(2wk − 1)
·
(
2wk − 2k gcd(w,k)
)2
=
2wk + 22k gcd(w,r) − 2k gcd(w,r)+1
2wk − 1
.
⊓⊔
For w = 32, n = 4, and r = 1, then E[CΠ ] is basically 1. As a consequence,
for a random permutation Π with a fixed point, then E[CΠ ] is basically 2.
4.2 ChaCha permutation vs random permutation
In Table 2, we display the lower and upper bounds of subsection 3.5, Theorem 3,
for w = 32, n = 4, r = 1, and rounds from 1 to 20. As we showed in subsection 4.1,
for a random permutation Π ∈ S(Fnw2 ) with one fixed point, a rotational collision
happens with probability very close to 2/2nw. In the case of ChaCha parameters
this probability is 1/2511. Thus, we can build a distinguisher A with access to
an oracle Oracle running either ChaChapi with ρ rounds or Π . Let L
ni and Uni be,
respectively, the upper and lower bound of Theorem 3, with i = 1, . . . , ρ. The al-
gorithmA runs as follow: generate binary stringsXi ∈ F
nw
2 for i = 1, . . . , ⌈1/U
ni⌉;
ask the oracle the corresponding output Yi = Oracle(Xi); if there exists i such
that
←−←−
Yi = Oracle(
←−←−
Xi) then the algorithm says the oracle is running ChaChapi. If
such i does not exists, then the oracle is running Π .
The complexity of the algorithm A is dominated by the 2⌈1/Uni⌉ calls to
the oracle. For example, to distinguish ChaChapi with 8 rounds, A performs 2
231
calls to the oracle, while for ChaChapi with 17 rounds, the calls are 2
489. After
the 17th round, A can not distinguish ChaChapi from Π anymore.
5 Conclusion
We showed that parallel rotational collisions are more likely to happen in ChaCha
underlying permutation with up to 17 rounds, than in a random permutation
of the same input size. We are not aware of any theoretical study of ChaCha
rotational properties, and we leave to future research finding an application of
our results to the cryptanalysis of ChaCha stream cipher.
Round Lower Bound Lni Upper Bound Uni Round Lower Bound Lni Upper Bound Uni
1 ∼ 2−27.32 ∼ 2−28.68 11 ∼ 2−300.52 ∼ 2−315.48
2 ∼ 2−54.64 ∼ 2−57.36 12 ∼ 2−327.84 ∼ 2−344.16
3 ∼ 2−81.96 ∼ 2−86.04 13 ∼ 2−355.16 ∼ 2−372.84
4 ∼ 2−109.28 ∼ 2−114.72 14 ∼ 2−382.48 ∼ 2−401.52
5 ∼ 2−136.60 ∼ 2−143.40 15 ∼ 2−409.80 ∼ 2−430.20
6 ∼ 2−163.92 ∼ 2−172.08 16 ∼ 2−437.12 ∼ 2−458.88
7 ∼ 2−191.24 ∼ 2−200.76 17 ∼ 2−464.45 ∼ 2−487.55
8 ∼ 2−218.56 ∼ 2−229.44 18 ∼ 2−491.77 ∼ 2−516.23
9 ∼ 2−245.88 ∼ 2−258.12 19 ∼ 2−519.09 ∼ 2−544.91
10 ∼ 2−273.20 ∼ 2−286.80 20 ∼ 2−546.41 ∼ 2−573.59
Table 2. Bounds propagation through ChaCha rounds with w = 32, n = 4, and r = 1.
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